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As the last stage in the risk-prevention programme for the Paris financial centre, the securing of
deferred net settlement systems concerns the SIT interbank clearing system, the retail payment
system for customer transactions, and Relit, the securities delivery-versus-payment system, which
in particular processes transactions effected on the regulated market Euronext Paris.
The Banque de France, which is in charge of overseeing the smooth functioning of payment and
securities settlement systems has taken the step of asking the French banking community to strengthen
the security of the SIT and Relit systems. The aim of this initiative to enhance security
(or built-in protection) is to protect these systems, in compliance with the applicable international
standards, from settlement risk. The risks borne by the participants in SIT and Relit are systemic in
character and this has been accentuated by the recent developments in the European environment
in which these systems operate.
The protection mechanisms defined for these two systems display similar features: protection against
the failure of the participant with the largest settlement obligation, establishment of a permanent
common mutual fund for each of the two systems, supplemented where necessary by individual collateral,
setting of ceilings for transactions exchanged, and use of central bank money holdings as collateral.
The implementation of these safety mechanisms for SIT and Relit will involve various players, who
will accordingly take on new responsibilities: participants in the two systems, the administrator of the
guarantee fund (a role which will fall to the operator of each of the two systems: GSIT for SIT and
Euroclear France for Relit), as well the depository for collateral, which will be the Banque de France.Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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A
t the beginning of the 1990s, at the
instigation of the Banque de France, the
Paris financial centre launched a
risk-prevention programme for payment systems.
Four objectives were set: tailoring the different
systems  according to the size and nature of the
payments they process; setting up a real-time gross
settlement system in central bank money for
large-value payments; dematerialising all interbank
exchanges; and securing deferred settlement
clearing systems. The first three objectives have
been met. To achieve the final objective, principles
of built-in protection have just been laid down for
the French clearing systems concerned: the SIT
interbank clearing system, which clears retail
payments, and the revocable channel of the RGV2
system of delivery versus payment of financial
instruments, known as Relit.
The built-in protection of a deferred settlement
clearing  system seeks to reduce as much as
possible the risk of the transactions exchanged in
this type of system being cancelled in the event
of one or several participants being unable to meet
their settlement obligations arising from these
exchanges. It thus makes it possible to prevent the
spread of the potential failure of one participant
to the other participants in this system and to other
interbank systems, and therefore to contribute to
the stability of the financial system. The setting
in place of a built-in protection mechanism is all
the more timely in that deferred settlement
clearing systems are potential channels via which
a domino effect can be transmitted: hence their
“systemic importance”. Over the past few years,
the systemic importance of SIT and Relit has
grown very substantially as a result, on the one
hand, of the centralisation within SIT of the
multilateral netting of all retail interbank
exchanges, and on the other, of the impact on Relit
of the pan-European integration in the context of
Euronext/Clearnet.
Moreover, the international standards applicable to
payment systems, as well as to securities settlement
systems, have recently laid down what is expected
of them in terms of built-in protection. It is in this
context that, at the request of the Banque de France,
French banks have just defined the principles
governing the built-in protection mechanisms
planned for SIT and Relit.
After rehearsing the risks linked to settlement
failure by participants in SIT and Relit, and setting
out the international standards applicable to them
with the aim of reducing this type of risk, this
article will present the principles of the safety
mechanisms envisaged.
The operational features of SIT and Relit are at the
root of the specific settlement risks to which their
participants are exposed, should one of them default.
1| Risks associated with settlement failure
by participants in SIT and Relit
These risks have taken on a new magnitude with
the developments in the two systems and in the
European environment within which they operate.Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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Box 1
SIT as it currently operates
The SIT processes retail payments arising from customer transactions, with the exception of customer transfers
in excess of EUR 800,000, which have to be exchanged in TBF (Transfert Banque de France) or PNS (Paris Net
Settlement). With the completion of the dematerialisation of interbank payment transactions at the end of the first
half of 2002, SIT has become the sole system in France for the exchange of retail payment media and the largest
European system both in terms of the volumes exchanged and the total value of the transactions processed
(around 45 million transactions a day, with a value in the region of EUR 20 billion, and an average amount of
cash debtor balances settled in TBF of nearly EUR 13 billion).
Average daily amount of SIT cash debtor balances settled in TBF
(EUR billions)
SIT is run by GSIT (Groupement d’intérêt économique pour le système interbancaire de télécompensation)
which was set up in 1983 by the main French banks, the French Post Office and the Banque de France. It is a
payment system ensuring multilateral netting, which processes transactions between participants in three
stages: continuous exchange of payment orders directly between banks’ IT centres; multilateral netting of
orders via an accounting centre; and the settlement of net balances in the TBF system. All SIT
participants’ balances must be simultaneously booked to the central settlement accounts held by direct
participants with the Banque de France. Once they are recorded, transactions are deemed irrevocable and
unconditional. This guarantees settlement finality.
NB: For a description of SIT, see also the article entitled “The French Retail Payment System” published in the April 2003 edition of the Digest
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Box 2
Relit as it currently operates
On 12 June 2001, Euroclear France, which replaced Sicovam SA in January of the same year following its merger
with Euroclear Bank, launched a new delivery-versus-payment system for financial instruments called RGV 2,
comprising a revocable channel (Relit) and an irrevocable channel (RGV). Relit is, according to the relevant
international terminology, a delivery-versus-payment system of the Model 2 type, i.e. one in which trades on the
securities side are settled on a gross basis 1, while transactions on the cash side are settled on a net basis. It is used
for transactions that do not require immediate irrevocability, that is, mainly equity transactions originating on
the regulated markets of Euronext Paris and over-the-counter transactions between participants that have expressly
chosen this channel to settle their transactions. This channel operates according to the principle of deferred
irrevocability, cash payments taking place via TBF on a net basis three times during the day, with cash debtor
balances of an average daily value of around EUR 13 billion.
Average daily amount of Relit cash debtor balances settled in TBF
(EUR billions)
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1|1 Operational features of  SIT
and Relit
Both SIT and Relit display two essential features
that are traditionally associated with particular
potential risks: they are systems that operate on
the basis of multilateral netting of payment orders
and in which the settlement of participants’ net
obligations is deferred relative to the processing of
underlying unit payments.
Multilateral netting is a method of offsetting
obligations which is based on the replacement 1 of
unit payments between participants by a
multilateral  net balance of each participant vis-à-vis
all the other participants.
Deferred settlement means that there is a time lag
between the recording and processing of unit payment
orders and the calculation by the system of net cash
balances on the one hand, and on the other hand, the
settlement of these net balances on the books of the
1 By means of novation or, depending on the jurisdiction, by any comparable legal provision that ensures the offsetting of a number of underlying
obligations by a single payment.Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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Box 3
 The two types of multilateral netting
Traditionally two types of multilateral netting are distinguished, that which is carried out via a central counterparty
and that in which no central counterparty is involved.
In both SIT and Relit, multilateral netting takes place without a central counterparty, which means that the
operators of the two systems, GSIT and Euroclear France respectively, have the role of calculation agents, the
technical operators of each system, but at no time act as counterparties or guarantors of the transactions processed.
In the case of Relit, a large proportion of the transactions derive from the regulated market and benefit upstream
from the delivery-versus-payment system and the guarantee of Clearnet, the clearing house of the Euronext
markets. However, this guarantee obeys its own rules and does not cover the timely settlement of balances in the
Relit system. Moreover, the Relit cash balance of each participant is a total figure, with no distinction made in
terms of the transaction channel involved (i.e. regulated market, over-the-counter). Thus, in the event of the
settlement failure of a participant, it would not be possible to distinguish between instructions coming from the
regulated market and covered upstream by the guarantee provided by Clearnet (through its sub-system
Inter-Sociétés de Bourse) and other transactions.
settlement agent, which alone gives a definitive
character to the different underlying payment
instructions  (the concept of “settlement finality”).
A payment system can operate on the basis of
multilateral netting without requiring deferred
payment. Payment systems, especially for
large-value payments, increasingly provide netting
facilities combined with continuous settlement with
immediate finality. The fact that Relit and SIT use
deferred settlement can mainly be explained by the
fact that they are retail systems that are designed
to process a very large volume of transactions of
small or medium unit value (see Boxes 1 and 2).
For technical reasons, it is therefore necessary to
allow a sufficient lapse of time, extending overnight,
to enter and process the different instructions that
provide the basis for the calculation of the different
participants’ net payment obligations.
For SIT, the operating day starts at 3 p.m. on T for a
settlement that will only take place on T+1 at
3.15 p.m.; for Relit, it starts at 8.00 p.m., for
settlement on T+1 at 11.00 a.m. In addition, Relit
has also two other later settlement sessions
– “déversements” (overspill) – in the afternoon,
making it possible to recycle unsettled outstanding
transactions from the morning and to unwind
same-day value transactions, which account for
roughly 10 % of the total volume of transactions.
In both systems, finality for all transactions is
achieved when net cash balances are settled in
central bank money on participants’ accounts
(or those of their authorised representatives,
known as “settlement participants”), held with and
handled by the RTGS system (TBF) managed by
the Banque de France.
1|2 Risks generated by these systems
in the event
of a participant’s failure
The  advantages and risks inherent in multilateral
netting combined with deferred settlement have
been studied by central banks  2. The use of this
system of offsetting obligations brings about a
significant reduction in payment flows and liquidity
needs compared to other methods of offsetting
obligations (bilateral netting and settlement on a
gross basis). On the other hand, multilateral netting
creates interdependence among all of the
participants in the system concerned, since the
settlement failure of a single participant with a net
debtor position prevents the settlement of the
balances of all of the participants – according to a
principle of “all or nothing” – and consequently of
all the underlying transactions processed by the
system. This situation exposes non-defaulting
2 Reports by the Bank for International Settlements on netting systems (the Angell Report – February 1989) and on the interbank netting systems
of the central banks of the G10 countries (Lamfalussy Report – November 1990).Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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participants to considerable risks: principal risk,
liquidity risk, replacement cost risk, as well as
secondary risks (i.e. those without a direct financial
impact), which may be borne by players other  than the
participants (i.e. system operators, the central bank).
This enumeration of the risks inherent in deferred
net settlement systems makes it possible to identify
the risks associated with participation in SIT and Relit.
It is useful in this regard to distinguish between the
situations of temporary failure and ultimate failure.
Principal risk can be defined as the risk of losing the
entire value of a payment as the result of settlement
failure in the system. This, notably in securities
settlement systems, is the situation in which a
participant has payment obligations to meet, but,
owing to the failure of its counterparty, does not receive
the settlement of the corresponding reciprocal
obligation. In Relit, which is a delivery-versus-payment
system, this risk is non-existent since, in the event the
buyer failing to settle the price, the seller’s securities
will not be delivered. As far as SIT is concerned, the
procedure of revocation of exchanges in the event of
settlement failure (a procedure that consists in
recalculating participants’ net balances after the
defaulter’s transactions have been removed) should
also eliminate principal risk with regard to interbank
settlement. However, principal risk may remain if
non-defaulting participants do not also suspend
payments with their customers that result from
transactions with the defaulters’ customers. If this
measure is not taken, non-defaulters risk paying their
clients without having received the corresponding
interbank settlement.
However, participants in SIT and Relit are exposed
to other types of risk that are specific to multilateral
netting systems in the event of failure: liquidity risk,
cost replacement risk and non-financial risk.
Box 4
Temporary failure and ultimate failure
Temporary failure is the situation in which a participant with a debtor balance arising from SIT or Relit is unable
to meet its obligations within the time frame set by TBF’s rules (the “settlement period” in TBF terminology) for a
localised reason (i.e. a technical problem at the credit institution, human error leading to late settlement or failure
by a participant to anticipate its liquidity situation).
This situation makes it impossible to settle the balances in the system and leads to the rejection by the Banque de
France of book entries, which are returned to the operator concerned. Having ensured that the defaulting participant
has taken the necessary measures to cover its balance, a new settlement “window” is opened in TBF for the
system concerned, in agreement with the Banque de France, the Centre for Interbank Funds Transfers  and the
system operator in question. This situation is liable to disrupt the smooth running of TBF, as a result of the
impact on the timing of its operations and the cash management of non-defaulting institutions, which will experience
a lag in their anticipated liquidity position. It is for this reason that the defaulter is subject to financial penalties,
and, in the event of a repeat occurrence, is liable to be barred from the TBF system by the Banque de France.
Ultimate settlement failure describes the situation in which a defaulter is unable, for reasons of durable insolvency
or illiquidity, to cover its balance on the day of value. This is an extreme scenario which, unlike temporary
failure, has never occurred either in SIT or in Relit, but whose impact would be potentially considerable.
Ultimate settlement failure is likely to expose other participants to substantial, liquidity and replacement
cost risks, as well as residual principal risk (in the case of SIT).
1    Which in this context provides a technical connection service between ancillary systems and TBF.Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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Liquidity risk arises from an unforeseen change in
the liquidity position of the different participants,
particularly those that are creditors in the system,
when the system cannot settle in due time. This
situation would force them to seek other funding
resources, which could give rise to strains on the
interbank market, with potential repercussions on
the conduct of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy.
Given the amounts processed by both Relit and SIT,
the consequences could be serious. They would
become systemic in character if, by a spillover
effect, the inability of an institution to settle its net
balance in one of the systems concerned brought
about the failure in other systems of non-defaulting
SIT or Relit participants. The scale of this risk for
SIT and Relit can be illustrated by measuring the
largest net debtor position displayed by one
participant. We can note that on average it amounts
to EUR 1 billion for SIT and EUR 400 million for
Relit, with atypical points that rise to as much as
EUR 3.5 billion for SIT and EUR 2 billion for Relit.
Replacement cost risk is specific to the Relit
system. Settlement failure in the cash part of
the system would obstruct the delivery of
securities on the correct value date, as Relit is a
delivery-versus-payment system in which the
payment of the price is the necessary
counterparty for the transfer of securities. If
they do not receive these securities, the buyer
institutions – particularly those that are
supposed to deliver securities to customers or
re-deliver them within another securities
settlement system – would have to obtain them,
potentially at a higher price than what should
have been settled in Relit.
Settlement failure may also give rise to secondary
risks of a non-financial nature.
In the absence of an adequate risk control
mechanism, settlement failure in SIT or Relit that
creates significant disruption in the functioning of
TBF and the system concerned could lead to risk in
terms of reputation, above all for the operators of
these systems but also for the Paris financial centre
and its post-market infrastructures as a whole.
Regarding SIT, which processes retail payments, a
major settlement failure that has a visible impact on
bank customers (delays in the settlement of
transactions) could go as far as to undermine public
confidence in payment media and the currency.
It is important to underline that the Banque de France,
as the operator of TBF and the settlement agent for
SIT and Relit, is not liable for financial risk in the
event of settlement failure in these systems. It is not,
anymore than are the operators of the systems in
question, a counterparty or guarantor of transactions.
In accordance with TBF’s operating rules, in the event
of insufficient funds at the end of the allotted time
period, the Banque de France confines itself to
recording that the balances deriving from the system
cannot be settled and returning the book entries to
the operator concerned; the latter is responsible for
resolving the problem within the framework of its
own failure management rules.
However, as the Lamfalussy Report sets out, a central
bank, that facilitates the settlement on its books of
a net payment system that is not equipped with an
appropriate settlement risk prevention and
management mechanism, exposes itself to the risk
(“moral hazard”) that this is understood
– wrongly so – by participants or third parties as an
implicit settlement guarantee by virtue of its role as
lender of last resort. In order to avoid this hazard, it
is important that the Banque de France, as the
oversight authority, encourages the parties
concerned to take appropriate measures to protect
SIT and Relit against settlement risk, and assesses
the appropriateness of the proposed mechanisms.
1|3 Growth of risks within SIT
and Relit
During the past few years, the risks to which SIT
and Relit are exposed have become more
substantial, particularly in the light of developments
in post-market and payment infrastructures at the
European level.
Since 1999 and Stage Three of EMU, the TBF system
has become the French component of TARGET. This
development reinforces the importance of adhering
to TBF’s operating hours, in particular to ensure
the settlement within the allotted timeframe of
systems such as Relit and SIT. The balances in these
systems must be finally settled in central bank
money in participants’ accounts held in TBF (these
systems are described in TBF terminology as
“ancillary”). Any delay within TBF would be liable
to entail a time lag across the whole of the TARGET
system.
With the creation of the pan-European stock market
Euronext, the transactions of which are cleared by a
single central counterparty, Clearnet, the risks linked
to the Relit system, which notably handles the
delivery-versus-payment trades executed onProtection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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Euronext Paris, go beyond the confines of a purely
domestic context. This process of European
integration is expected to result in the development
of a growing number of transfers of securities between
the different components of the Euroclear group.
In the absence of a satisfactory level of settlement
failure prevention, the Relit system could therefore
export its risks to other parts of the Euroclear group.
In 2002, with the setting-up of the Truncated Cheque
Exchange and the closure of the clearing houses, SIT
became the sole retail payment settlement system
in France and the largest in Europe, both in terms of
the volume and the value of the transactions
processed. This structural development in SIT’s
activity resulted in an increase from less than
30 million daily transactions processed in 2001 to
nearly 45 million in 2002, and from less than
EUR 10 billion in 2001 to nearly EUR 19 billion in
2002 in terms of the daily value of settlements.
1|4 Inadequacy of existing failure
management mechanisms
Currently – in the absence of an appropriate risk
prevention mechanism – ultimate settlement
failure in SIT or Relit could only be dealt with in
one of two ways: either by the recalculation of
participants’ balances after revocation of the
defaulter’s transactions, or by postponing the
settlement to a later date.
The first solution, which is called, depending
on the system, “revocation of exchanges”,
“removal/ cancellation”, or – in common parlance –
“unwinding”, consists in recalculating the netting,
having identified and eliminated the defaulter’s
transactions from the system. This procedure may
be partial when only some of the transactions are
revoked in order to bring the balance of the
defaulting institution back within the threshold of
what the latter is able to settle. Although
theoretically possible, this scenario is extremely
unlikely to occur as it requires both having the
technical capability to identify the defaulter’s
different transactions and obtaining the consent of
the counterparties involved in the transactions
being revoked. If unwinding were to take place, the
revocation procedure would therefore be likely to
involve all of the defaulter’s transactions.
This approach raises various problems and does
not appear to be a satisfactory way to manage
settlement failure.
First of all, it generates liquidity risk. The balances
recalculated after the defaulter’s exclusion are
liable, especially if the latter is a substantial
participant, to be significantly different from those
initially entered for settlement. Some participants
would see a reversal of their situation, moving from
a multilateral net creditor position to a debtor
position. This creates liquidity risk, which could
produce a domino effect and cause strains on the
interbank market. It is for this reason that
Euroclear France, which in September 2003
modified its operating rules by introducing a
“removal/cancellation” procedure, pending the
implementation of a security mechanism, has laid
down provisions aimed at containing liquidity risk.
Accordingly, each non-defaulting participant is
authorised to set the maximum debtor balance it
undertakes to settle following the recalculation of
the netting, the settlement of potential transactions
exceeding this amount being deemed to be pending
and postponed till the next day.
Secondly, applied to retail systems like SIT and Relit
that process large volumes of transactions on a daily
basis, the revocation of exchanges poses substantial
problems of technical feasibility. In the absence of
an automated procedure, the revocation of
exchanges within a time frame compatible with that
of the settlement of the relevant system in TBF
would be virtually impossible.
Finally, this type of procedure leaves unresolved
the question of the defaulter’s transactions that
have been excluded from the system, which
could have potentially serious consequences for
its customers.
The second solution set out in the crisis procedures
laid down by the Paris financial centre, would
consist – once it has been ascertained that the
failure cannot be processed during the trading day
in question – in postponing the settlement of
balances in the system to a later value date. In
the case of ultimate failure, this approach may
only be regarded as a secondary measure – notably
alongside the revocation of exchanges – but cannot
alone resolve the problem. Furthermore, as things
stand now, this approach would not comply with
the international standards applicable, in
particular the fourth Core Principal for
Systemically Important Payment Systems, which,
as a minimum, requires settlement by the end of
the day on the appropriate value date.Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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At present, given that no safety mechanism is in
place, the level of protection of the two systems is
not adequate to deal with ultimate settlement failure
on the part of a participant. Moreover, the lack of
protection of these systems poses a problem in terms
of compliance with the international standards
applicable, particularly in the light of the most recent
developments in this area.
2|1 International standards
applicable
The above-mentioned Lamfalussy Report laid down
back in 1990 the first of the standards applicable to
the containment of settlement risk in multilateral
netting payment systems. Among the six minimum
standards defined for these systems, standard IV
stipulates that “multilateral netting systems should,
at a minimum, be capable of ensuring the timely
completion of daily settlements in the event of an
inability to settle by the participant with the single
largest settlement obligation”.
Building on the Lamfalussy Report, the report on
“Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment
Systems” 3, lays down principles intended to govern
the design and operation of payment systems:
standard IV from the Lamfalussy Report is taken over
as Core Principle Fifth.
The same rule is to be found in recommendation
no. 9 of the CPSS-IOSCO4 report concerning
securities settlement systems, which stipulates that
“CSDs (Central Securities Depositories) that extend
intraday credit to participants, including CSDs that
operate net settlement systems, should institute risk
controls that, at a minimum, ensure timely
settlement in the event that the participant with the
largest payment obligation is unable to settle. The
most reliable set of controls is a combination of
collateral requirements and limits”.
Draft standards aimed at adapting the CPSS-IOSCO
recommendations, which are worldwide in their
scope, to the European context were put out for public
consultation in summer 2003. These draft proposals
were formulated by a joint working group of the ESCB
central banks and the CESR (the Committee of
2| The application of international standards
to SIT and Relit
European Securities Regulators), which brings
together the European securities markets regulators.
One of the proposed standards will take up and
develop CPSS-IOSCO recommendation no. 9.
2|2 Scope of international
standards
All of these standards derive from the same approach
and contain very similar requirements.
The first requirement concerns the aim of the safety
mechanism. A mechanism needs to be set in place
that, even in the event of a participant’s failure,
ensures the timely settlement of all of the balances
resulting from the multilateral netting of
exchanges. This requirement needs to be
understood with reference to the standards that
stipulate “prompt final settlement”, i.e. on the day
of value, preferably during the day and at the latest
by the end of the day.
The second requirement concerns the level of
financial risk the safety mechanism should be able
to withstand. The minimum level of built-in
protection of the different systems is defined as that
needed to withstand the failure of the participant with
the largest net settlement obligation in the system.
This second requirement needs further clarification
with regard to several points.
First of all, as with all of the standards mentioned
above, it is a minimum requirement. Since the
Lamfalussy Report of 1990, the system operators and
the central banks in charge of their oversight have
been encouraged to exceed this minimum standard,
as a matter of best practice.
3 Bank for International Settlements (February 2001).
4 The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, which brings together G10 central banks, and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions made up of securities markets regulators; Bank for International Settlements (November 2001).Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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A comprehensive safety mechanism means one that
guarantees ex ante the settlement of all of the net
debtor positions aggregated in the system. A lower
level of protection would only make it possible to
reduce but not entirely eliminate the liquidity and
replacement cost risks associated with multiple
failures exceeding the amount of the collateral held.
The appropriate level of protection is left to the
judgement of each system operator and of the
authorities charged with its oversight.
The optimum mechanism derives from an
assessment of the level of residual risks that is
deemed acceptable, one that constitutes a good
balance between, on the one hand, the magnitude
of the risks to which the system is exposed measured
according to both quantitative criteria (the value
processed by the system, the netting ratio,
concentration of transactions, etc.) and qualitative
criteria (the system’s importance for the
country’s economy, the nature of the transactions
processed, whether they are cross-border or purely
domestic in character), and, on the other hand, the
cost of implementing the safety mechanism
(opportunity costs associated with locking up of
collateral, technical investment, etc.).
It is important to stress that while comprehensive
protection against debtor positions makes it
possible to eliminate financial risk from deferred
net settlement systems, a net system with built-in
protection does not have the same legal
consequences (in terms of the moment at which
payment obligations become final) as a real-time
gross settlement system (RTGS). Settlement
finality, whatever the scenario, is only achieved
when the settlement of net balances actually takes
place, whereas a RTGS system facilitates
continuous settlement, and makes it possible to
reuse the cash and/or securities received for other
settlements immediately.
In practical terms, the different standards are not
prescriptive regarding the manner in which these
safety mechanisms are to be implemented.
Nonetheless, what comes out of the various
aforementioned reports is that a safety mechanism
generally displays three characteristics:
– first characteristic: the posting of collateral. The
assets used may vary (account balances at the
central bank, committed lines of credit, securities
or liquid claims issued by an entity with a high
credit rating, notably government securities),
Box 5
 International examples of safety mechanisms in multilateral netting systems
Among examples of payment systems that utilise multilateral netting and deferred settlement and that have set in
place protection mechanisms to contain settlement risk, the Euro 1 system owned by the Euro Banking Association
may be mentioned. This system processes cross-border euro-denominated payments and has two specialised
channels for cross-border retail payments, STEP 1 and STEP 2. The whole system is protected against multiple
failures by means of a guarantee fund held with the European Central Bank.
On the securities side, recent initiatives have been taken in Europe to increase the level of safety of systems
operating on the basis of multilateral netting for cash transactions. Thus, from December 2003, the net channel
of the Italian system Express II is to incorporate a liquidity reserve mechanism that guarantees the system's
night-time processing. In Germany, since November 2003 the central depository Clearstream Banking Frankfurt
has been able to settle night-time transactions up to the level of the funds set aside by participants on their
accounts held with the Bundesbank.Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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[but in all cases they must be sufficiently liquid
to be mobilised without delay in the event of a
failure and enable the system to take the place
of the defaulter within the confines of the trading
day. It is common for a central bank to be chosen
as a depository for collateral, thus ensuring that
it is kept safe and can be liquidated more easily.
There are two main procedures for the posting
and use of collateral. Generally, two types of
system are distinguished: collective systems
(“survivors pay”) and individualised systems
(“defaulter pays”). The collective system is overall
less costly, given that the same guarantee fund
serves to cover the potential unit failure of any
participant. But it is also riskier, as the collateral
provided by each participant is liable to be used
to address the failure of a third party, in which
case it would be lost definitively. In an
individualised system, this risk is eliminated since
the assets provided as collateral by a participant
are intended to cover its own potential failure,
but not that of other participants;
– second characteristic: when the collateral is held
wholly or partly in a collective form, a loss sharing
mechanism is required that sets out in advance
the procedures and sequencing of the different
available collateral and the principles governing
the allocation of potential losses in the event of
the defaulter being unable to reimburse the
portion of the guarantee fund that has been used;
– third characteristic: the system should set in place a
threshold mechanism that ensures that the
processing of each participant’s transactions cannot
result in a multilateral debtor balance whose amount
exceeds the guarantees available, in accordance with
the rules laid down for safety mechanisms.
2|3 The Banque de France’s role
in the application
of international standards
to SIT and Relit
Article L 141-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code
stipulates that, within the framework of the tasks of
the ESCB, the Banque de France is responsible for
overseeing the smooth running and security of
payment systems and clearing, settlement and
delivery-versus payment-systems 5.
In this context, the Banque de France, acting
simultaneously as the TBF operator, the settlement
agent for SIT and Relit and in its oversight role, has
a major interest in ensuring that these systems are
equipped with an appropriate level of protection
against settlement risk.
Its oversight role first led the Banque de France
to take the step of asking the operators of the
systems concerned, GSIT and Euroclear France,
to ensure the safety of systems of which they are
in charge, in accordance with the international
standards applicable.
Within this role, it also falls to the
Banque de France to assess ex ante compliance with
the principles concerning the protection
mechanisms chosen and ex post their actual
implementation. This assessment is part of the
more general evaluation that the Banque de France
has undertaken to carry out by the end of 2003: on
the one hand of SIT’s compliance with the Core
Principles  for Systemically Important Payment
Systems  6, and on the other of Euroclear France’s
system RGV2, of which Relit is one of the channels,
in the light of the CPSS-IOSCO recommendations
for securities settlement systems.
The definition of the safety mechanisms, their
principles and practical arrangements is the
responsibility of the operators of and
participants in the respective systems.
Accordingly, the discussions on safety
mechanisms for the SIT and Relit systems have
been conducted in France by task forces bringing
together the different parties involved, including
the operators and representatives of the
participants, under the aegis of the French
Banking Federation, whose decision-making
authorities have approved the task
forces’ conclusions. The Banque de France has
taken part in these task forces as an observer,
in particular to clarify the scope of the
applicable international standards.
5 Without prejudice to the competence of the Financial Markets Council and the Commission Bancaire with regard to clearing, settlement and
delivery-versus-payment systems.
6 Adopted officially by the Eurosystem as the basis for its oversight policy for payment systems in January 2001.Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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The safety mechanisms selected for both SIT and
Relit are based on similar principles: protection
against the failure of the participant with the largest
single settlement obligation, the establishment of a
permanent mutual fund for each of the systems,
supplemented as necessary by individual collateral,
and the setting of upper limits for the transactions
exchanged. Collateral takes solely the form of central
bank money holdings, the use of other types of assets




The contributions deposited in the permanent
guarantee fund of each of the systems are allocated
to the participants as a whole and may be realised to
cover the payment failure of a debtor balance in the
system of one or several participants.
The total amount to be paid into the permanent
mutual fund is determined on the basis of the debtor
balances recorded in the system in the period
preceding the provisioning of the fund (from six to
twelve months). It is thus set up so that it covers
the bulk (between 85% and 95%) of the debtor
balances recorded, in order to limit the use made
of individual collateral.
Each participant’s contribution to the permanent
mutual fund is calculated either on the basis of
the debtor balances alone (in the case of Relit), or
on the basis of the debtor and creditor balances it
recorded during the period preceding the
provisioning of the fund (in the case of SIT).
Regarding SIT, some participants are systematically
in a creditor position and the level of their
contribution to the fund is justified by the reduction
of the risk that their transactions will not be settled.
The total amount and contributions to the fund are
to be adjusted at regular intervals to take account of
developments in participants’ debtor balances.
 3| Principles governing
SIT and Relit’s safety mechanisms
3|2 Complementary individual
collateral
Relit and SIT’s safety mechanisms provide for the
posting of complementary individual and temporary
collateral for participants whose transactions are
liable to be suspended on the grounds that they
would result in a debtor balance that is greater than
the total amount of the permanent mutual fund.
This individual collateral is deposited by the
participant, either intraday or overnight, in
accordance with its expected turnover within
the system.
The amounts that are remitted as complementary
individual collateral by a participant may only be
realised in order to cover the participant’s failure to
settle its debtor balance in the system, and may not
be used to cover another participant’s debtor balance
or for any other purpose.
Complementary individual collateral is to be used
for the settlement of the balance of the participant
posting the collateral within the system; in the case
of Relit, they may also be returned – under certain
conditions – at the request of the participants
between two settlement cycles.
3|3 Legal regime covering collateral
The legal framework covering collateral held on behalf
of payment and securities delivery-versus-payment
systems provides a high level of security under French
law. Assets are submitted, with the transfer of full
ownership rights in the form of collateral, by the
participant to the administrator of the collateral, the
latter acting as an authorised representative for all the
other participants, in accordance with article L.330-2
of the Monetary and Financial Code. These remittances
can  without further formality be raised against the
participants’ and administrator’s creditors.
RGV2’s operating rules and the charter governing SIT 
will need to be modified accordingly.Protection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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  Box 6
Operating procedures adopted for Relit
Making the Relit system secure entails a change in the operating perimeter of the system. Thus, participants will
be invited to redirect their largest transactions to the irrevocable channel of the delivery-versus-payment system
(RGV), where they will benefit from real-time gross settlement in central bank money, which will permit them to
reduce their debtor balances to be guaranteed in Relit accordingly. As the settlement of securities transactions
(coupons, redemptions, etc.) is not the counterparty of securities delivery, these transactions are excluded from
the security perimeter and will be settled separately in TBF.
Relit’s safety mechanism will be based on a compulsory mutual fund supplemented by individual collateral
posted on a voluntary basis. TBF's structure makes it possible for several participants in the same banking group
to share a “Group of Accounts”, which is used to assess the liquidity available for the settlement of any transaction.
As a consequence, each of the Group of Accounts administrators in TBF will be responsible for setting net long
positions (NLP) in Relit for the participants that settle their positions via the Group of Accounts, i.e. compulsory
upper limits for the debtor cash balances they are liable to generate via their transactions in Relit. The total
amount of NLPs of the Group of Accounts administrator and those of the participants that settle their positions
via the Group of Accounts may not exceed the amount of the mutual fund.
GA: Group of Accounts
SP: Settlement Participant (settlement agent in TBF for its account and for the account of a third party)
DPAS: Direct Participant in the Ancillary System (Relit cash clearer participant, and thus holder of its own NLP,
but without an account in TBF, using the services of a SP to settle of its balances).
A participant’s debtor position in Relit may not exceed its overall NLP, calculated as the sum of its NLP based on
the collective fund and its individual collateral if posted. Euroclear France plans to introduce a system of upper
limits in order to suspend the settlement of transactions liable to lead to these overall NLPs being exceeded.
Individual guarantees will be held by the GA administrators according to the needs of the Relit participants that
settle their positions via them. Thus, individual collateral of 100 held by GA A on behalf of DPAS 2 would allow
the latter to raise its overall NLP from 80 to 180.
Consistency check



































of GA B (SP 4)
400
Consistency check
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3|4 Use of the permanent
guarantee fund in the event
of a participant’s failure
A participant’s failure will remain defined in the
same terms as at present as the situation in which
a participant is unable (either temporarily or
definitively) to settle its debtor balance in the
system (after taking account of the amount of the
complementary individual collateral that it may
have deposited), because there are insufficient
funds in the TBF Group of Accounts via which it
settles its positions, at the end of the settlement
period set within TBF.
In order to address a failure and facilitate the
settlement of the system’s balances in TBF, the fund
administrator, acting as an authorised representative
for all of the participants, debits the cash
corresponding to the amount to be covered from the
permanent guarantee fund. The sum deducted is
taken in the first instance from the defaulting
participant’s contribution and then, if need be, from
the other participants’ contributions to the fund.
Each non-defaulting participant thus has a claim on
the  defaulting participant corresponding to its share
in the permanent guarantee fund. In order to
safeguard against abuses, use of the fund will be
heavily penalised. The defaulting participant may
only participate again in the system once it has
settled its debt and the relevant penalties. If it is
unable to do so, the non-defaulting participants will
be obliged to make contributions in order to restore
the total amount of the permanent guarantee fund.
The protection mechanisms for the French systems
in question have been the subject of in-depth
discussions with the banking profession and in the
end constitute a combination of the “survivors pay”
and “defaulters pay” principles, making it possible
both to limit the costs involved in securing the
systems and to provide a degree of flexibility.
However, this combination does not preclude the
eventuality of a cancellation of the transactions
exchanged in the system. Thus, it is not required of
each participant that it covers a priori and on an
individual basis all of the risks to which it exposes
the system (“defaulter pays”), nor that all of the
participants undertake to honour defaulting
participants’ settlements, whatever the amount of
the sums to be covered (“survivors pay”). In the event
of the simultaneous failure of several participants,
it therefore cannot be ruled out that the amount of
the collateral held might be insufficient to pay their
debtor balances. In this scenario, which is however
an extremely unlikely one, the settlement agent
would reject all of the balances in the system,
leaving it to the latter to “unwind” the
corresponding transactions and to carry out a fresh
netting operation in which the defaulting
participants’ transactions are rejected.
3|5 The role of the different players
in implementing
safety mechanisms
The setting in place of safety mechanisms for SIT
and Relit will involve several players, whose roles
are complementary and will evolve relative to the
current situation. They comprise the participants,
the guarantee fund administrator, the depository for
collateral, and market infrastructures.
The participants will have to deposit their
contributions to the permanent mutual fund when
the fund is established. If all or part of it is utilised,
they will be obliged to make fresh contributions
within a very short space of time. In addition, the
level of contributions will be assessed on a regular
basis in order to take account of developments in
each participant’s risk profile. Moreover, participants
liable to record a debtor balance greater than the
amount held in the permanent mutual fund will be
obliged to set in place a monitoring procedure for
their position in order to determine the amount of
individual collateral required to ensure the
smoothness of their transactions.
Responsibility for administering the guarantee
mechanism will be assigned to the relevant system
operator: Euroclear France for Relit and GSIT for SIT.
They will thus be in charge of calculating the level
of contributions to the mutual fund using
predetermined  calculation rules, ensuring that no
debtor balance of any participant in the system
exceeds the total amount of  collateral held;
reimbursing individual collateral automatically or at
the participant’s request; and lastly, making available
to the system’s settlement agent the assets deposited
in the fund in the event of an institution’s failure
involving an amount that exceeds the latter’s
individual collateral. Participants will give the
administrator express authorisation to open the
account for the permanent guarantee fund and theProtection of deferred net payment and securities settlement systems: the examples of SIT and Relit
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accounts for the complementary individual collateral
on the books of the depository for collateral. The
administrator alone will be authorised to debit the
account of the permanent guarantee fund and the
accounts for the complementary individual collateral.
As a result, participants will not be able to carry out
any transaction on any of these accounts, apart from
the remittance of collateral.
As the system’s settlement agent, the Banque de
France will apply the rules concerning the settlement
of  balance files of the systems concerned and will
call on the guarantee fund administrator in the event
of the failure of one of the participants. The
Banque de France was chosen by the participants to
be the depository of the guarantee funds and the
individual collateral and, in this capacity, will hold
these sums on its books. In addition to the absence
of default risk, the choice of the Banque de France
as depository was based on operational
considerations (speed of liquidation of collateral
facilitated by the close link between its functions as
settlement agent and depository).
These safety principles will be added to each
system’s rules. In addition, all of these
responsibilities will be set out in a tripartite
convention between the system operator, the
participant and the Banque de France. Each
participant in the system will be obliged to sign this
convention and to submit its contribution to the
permanent mutual fund.
Specific settlement rules will also need to be added
for the new types of system that these secure net
systems will become and the contractual
agreements between the participants in TBF and
the Banque de France (the central settlement
account agreement) will need to be modified
accordingly. Moreover, the daily settlement
timetable, which stipulates the settlement hours of
each system in TBF, will need to be reviewed in
order to take account of these new provisions. Thus,
for example, settlement periods will be reduced in
order to create the lapse of time necessary in the
event of the fund being mobilised.
The Banque de France has brought to the attention of the French banking community the need for
French net systems to comply with international standards as quickly as possible. Guidelines
have already been adopted with a view to implementing the safety mechanisms. In the case of
Relit, implementation is scheduled for the first quarter of 2004. As regards SIT, application of the
principles laid down requires substantial changes to the system’s architecture. Consequently, and
in accordance with the Eurosystem’s declaration of July 2003 concerning the oversight framework
with regard to retail payment systems 1, SIT’s built-in protection mechanism will be put in place
as part of the progressive renovation of the system currently under review. An essential step for
the security and competitiveness of the Paris financial centre will then have been taken and the
French risk prevention programme will be complete. French systems and their participants will
then be in a favourable position vis-à-vis the restructuring under way in Europe, both in the
areas of securities and retail payments.
1 See the Banque de France’s website: www.banque-france.fr, under the section Banking and Financial Information/Oversight of payment
instruments, payment systems and securities settlement systems.